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Abstract
This paper uses data from a household survey to estimate changes in land distribu-
tion in rural West Bengal between 1967-2004 and decompose these into contributions
of diﬀerent factors. There was a substantial drop in land per household and land per
capita, while within-village inequality rose. The latter was associated mainly with rising
landlessness induced by high rates of household division for marginal and small landown-
ing households. Conversely, division of large landowning households reduced inequality.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of the tenancy reform (Operation Barga) on inequal-
ity, as it reduced division rates of small landowning households while raising those of
large landowning households. The land titling (patta) program also reduced inequality
by reducing landlessness. Land markets were highly active, and were mildly equalizing.
The inequality reducing eﬀects of land reforms and land markets were dwarfed by the
rising inequality and landlessness induced by division of small landowning households
and immigration.
1 Introduction
Land is the pre-eminent asset in rural sectors of developing countries, the primary determi-
nant of livelihoods of the poor. Many developing countries have recently experienced marked
reductions in per capita and per household landownership, a factor that has reduced the
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1ability of the rural poor to sustain their livelihoods from traditional agricultural occupa-
tions, inducing a ‘push’ towards non-agricultural occupations. Inequality of landownership
and tenancy arrangements are key determinants of wealth and income inequality within the
rural sector, with important implications for agricultural productivity, poverty, local gov-
ernance and social capital (Berry and Cline (1979), Binswanger et al (1993), Banerjee et
al (2001), Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002), Bardhan (2004)). Many arguments have
thus been made for the need for land reforms in the developing world as an instrument for
reducing land inequality and poverty, raising productivity, improving governance and easing
social and political tensions.
To evaluate these arguments, it is important to assess the poverty-reduction and growth
enhancing eﬀects of land reforms, and in particular the channels by which they operate.
Given the high correlation between rural poverty and landlessness, one needs to understand
the eﬀect of land reform on landlessness to study its eﬀect on poverty reduction. Farms
of diﬀering sizes typically select diﬀerent organizational forms of production which diﬀer
in productivity. For instance, small farms are frequently found to be more productive in
rice growing areas owing to their greater reliance on family labor. Hence changes in the size
distribution of farms are likely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect aggregate productivity, after controlling
for within-farm incentive eﬀects. The impacts of land reform should thus include impacts on
the land distribution, representing general equilibrium eﬀects operating through the market
for land, immigration and household division. Most existing literature by contrast has
focused mainly on partial equilibrium eﬀects of land reform on within-farm incentives.
Besides implied eﬀects on poverty reduction and productivity growth, eﬀects on inequal-
ity and poverty are also of interest in their own right; land inequality and landlessness
are prime determinants of these. The eﬀect of land reforms on land distribution is not
straightforward: the distribution of landownership depends on market transactions, division
of households and migration patterns. One needs to understand how these social and market
processes are aﬀected by land reform, in order to assess whether the resulting indirect eﬀects
accentuate or moderate the direct eﬀects.
In theory there could be several eﬀects going in opposite directions. For instance the
threat of appropriation of land for households with land above the allotted ceilings may
motivate them to sub-divide in order to evade the ceiling, or keep the land within the larger
family. Tenancy regulation can reduce the proﬁtability of leasing out lands to tenants;
awarding land titles to the landless may restrict the supply of agricultural workers, raise
wage rates and thus render cultivation by hired workers less proﬁtable. These may thus
motivate selling oﬀ of lands by households with large properties, or subdivision among
various family members who switch to cultivation based on family labor. These eﬀects
would be likely to reduce land inequality. On the other hand, medium and small farms
may also be motivated to subdivide, in order to be eligible for land titles being distributed,
and owing to rising wages and productivity of small farms. This can set oﬀ a process of
landownership decline which in due course leads to landsizes being too small to be viable for
2cultivation, eventually leading the family to sell oﬀ all its land. Land reforms may attract in-
migration if immigrating households expect to receive land titles: by enlarging the number
of resident households who start with no land, landlessness may increase. The overall eﬀects
are therefore theoretically ambiguous.
Besides the question of inequality eﬀects of land reform, we are also interested in un-
derstanding the factors driving changes in the land distribution, such as the division of
households and migration patterns. Whether or not the land market is active is another
classic question in development economics that has not received enough attention, owing
mainly to lack of suitable data. And even if it is active, whether the land market tends to
equalize or disequalize the land distribution bears on debates concerning regulation of land
markets. Arguments for regulation typically argue that the land market is thin, and most
transactions tend to take the form of distress sales wherein small and marginal landowners
sell their land to large landowners. Those arguing for deregulation emphasize the role of
a vibrant land market in allowing more able farmers to expand their operations by buying
out the land of less productive farmers, and argue that the land market tends to equalize
landholdings as small farms tend to be more productive than large farms.
This paper examines the experience of West Bengal, a state in Eastern India with a
population of 80 million, which ranks among the middle among Indian states with regard
to both economic indicators as well as human development. Over the past four decades
West Bengal has witnessed implementation of land reforms on a much larger scale than
the average Indian state, distributing 6.7% of agricultural land in the form of land titles
to the poor by the early 1990s compared with a national average of 1.35% (Appu (1996)),
and registering tenancy agreements for over 1.5 million sharecroppers which protected them
from eviction and put a ﬂoor to their cropshares. Most assessments of these reforms have
found favorable eﬀects on agricultural productivity and incomes, both at the farm level
(Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011)) and at higher levels of aggregation such as the district
(Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002)). Besley and Burgess (2000) examine the eﬀect at the
level of states, an even higher level of aggregation, using legislative measures of land reform;
they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on poverty reduction. The eﬀect on the distribution of land
itself has not been studied, except for a small number of village case studies (e.g., Lieten
(1992), Sengupta and Gazdar (1996), Rawal (2001)). Some commentators (e.g., Lieten
(1992) have informally argued that the land reforms in West Bengal were instrumental
in lowering inequality between 1970 and 1985, and in explaining why small and marginal
landowners own a larger proportion of land compared with neighboring states Bihar and
Uttar Pradesh. Yet Bardhan and Mookherjee (2010, 2011) have noted that the land reforms
involved a relatively small fraction of agricultural land, and that the bulk of the observed
changes in the land distribution reﬂect changes in landownership owing to other factors
such as household division and market transactions. This raises the question of the extent
to which these social and market processes may have been indirectly aﬀected by the land
reforms.
3We study the evolution of land distribution in a sample of 89 villages drawn from major
agricultural districts of West Bengal. We utilize results from a survey of approximately
25 households in each village conducted in 2004-05, which was designed to trace the land
histories of each household since 1967. These include details of land purchases and sales, land
appropriated or distributed by land reform authorities, household divisions, immigration,
exits of family members as well as major demographic changes such as marriages, births
and deaths.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant declines in mean household and per capita landholdings, along with
rising landlessness and inequality. The most important factor underlying changes in the
land distribution was division of households, which includes household splitting and exit of
individual members. Secondary important inﬂuences were high rates of immigration into
villages from other parts of the country. Much of the increased inequality was associated
with rising landlessness, induced by high rates of division of small and marginal landowning
households, and immigration. Division of large landowning households tended to reduce
inequality, but these eﬀects were dominated by division of smaller landowning households.
Land reforms had a relatively small direct eﬀect on inequality. However, they exercised a
statistically signiﬁcant negative indirect eﬀect. The tenancy registration program lowered
inequality by lowering division rates of small landowning households while raising division
rates of large landowning households; the land titling program lowered the incidence of
landlessness. The land market was highly active, and tended to reduce inequality slightly.
Nevertheless, the equalizing eﬀects of the land reforms and land markets were outweighed
overall by the eﬀects of high rates of division of small landowning households and rising
immigration, both of which raised the proportion of the landless.
The next section describes the nature of the data. The following section presents a num-
ber of ﬁgures that summarize the key changes in land distribution, land reform, household
division, immigration and market transactions between 1967 and 2004, which helps assess
the respective roles of these various phenomena in explaining changes in land distribution.
This is followed by results of cross-section and panel regressions both at the household and
village level for land market transactions, household division and immigration that illustrate
the indirect eﬀect of the land reforms on these phenomena. The ﬁnal section summarizes
the main ﬁndings.
2 Data
The survey involved 2,402 households in a sample of 89 villages in West Bengal. The village
sample is a sub-sample of an original stratiﬁed random sample of villages selected from all
major agricultural districts of the state (only Kolkata and Darjeeling are excluded) by the
Socio-Economic Evaluation Branch (SEEB) of the Department of Agriculture, Government
of West Bengal, for the purpose of calculating cost of cultivation of major crops in the state
4between 1981 and 1996. The same sample is used in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006, 2010,
2011) and Bardhan, Mookherjee and Parra-Torrado (2010) for earlier studies of targeting of
local government programs, political economy and productivity eﬀects of the land reforms.
The village selection procedure used by SEEB was the following: a random sample of
blocks was selected in each district. Within each block one village was selected randomly,
followed by random selection of another village within a 8 Km radius. Our survey teams
visited these villages between 2003 and 2005, carried out a listing of landholdings of every
household, then selected a stratiﬁed random sample (stratifying by landownership) of ap-
proximately 25 households per village (with the precise number varying with the number
of households in each village). 2 additional households were selected randomly from middle
and large landowning categories respectively, owning 5-10 acres and more than 10 acres of
cultivable land. This was to ensure positive representation of these groups, which are small
in number in many villages. The stratiﬁcation of the sample of households was based on
a prior census of all households in each village, in which demographic and landownership
details were collected from a door-to-door survey.
Representatives (typically the head) of selected households were subsequently adminis-
tered a survey questionnaire consisting of their demographic and land history since 1967,
besides economic status, economic activities, beneﬁts received from various development
programs administered by GPs, involvement in activities pertaining to local governments
(gram panchayats (GPs)), politics and local community organizations. Response rates were
extremely high: only 15 households out of 2400 of those originally selected did not agree to
participate, and were replaced by randomly selected substitutes.
We combine the household-level data with data on the extent of land reform carried by
the land reform authorities in each of these villages (which is available until the year 1998).
Additional village-level information is available from previous surveys concerning various
agricultural development programs implemented by local governments, productivity in a
farm panel drawn from these villages for subperiods, and in indirect household land survey
for each village corresponding to 1978 (or 1983) and 1998 (in which village elders compiled
household land distributions for each of these two years, based on an enumeration of voters
for each village).
2.1 Constructing Land and Household Size Time Series: Key Problems
The survey data included each household’s land holding at the time of being surveyed (2004)
and as of 1967. In subsequent blocks the respondents were asked to list all land transactions
that occurred in between these two dates, for each of the following categories: acquisitions
(purchases, patta (land titles received), gifts and others), disposals (sales, transfers, appro-
priation by land reform authorities, and natural disaster), and household division (involving
both exits of individual members and household splits). We focus on agricultural land, both
irrigated and unirrigated (in order to determine the relevant ceiling imposed by the land
5reform laws, which incorporate irrigation status and household size). Corresponding changes
in household demographics on account of births, deaths, and marriages were also recorded.
An eﬀort was made in the questionnaire design to distinguish between exit of individual
members and household splitting (where a household sub-unit consisting of at least two
members left the original household). But the questionnaire responses indicate that the
interviewers and respondents tended to lump the two together. In order to avoid double-
counting, we merged the observations that were both in the individual exit and household
splitting datasets. We classiﬁed the cause of individual exit and household division into four
categories: death of the member of the household, exit of the spouse of the head due to
death of the head of the household, out-marriage, and exit/division due to other reasons
(such as change in household size, change in income/expenditure, disputes, registration of
tenants and threat of land reforms). Table 1 shows that the latter category is by far the
most relevant, both in terms of frequency of ocurrence and amount of land involved.
Recalling the details of past changes in landholdings over the past three decades can
be a challenging task. In order to gauge the signiﬁcance of recall problems, we checked
the consistency of reported landholdings in 1967 and 2004 with reports of land changes in
the intervening period. Starting with the 2004 land holdings, we added in all transactions
for any given year to compute the total land holding in the previous year. Repeating this
iteratively, we calculated landholdings for every previous year until 1967.1 We compare the
estimated landholding in 1967 with that actually reported for that year. For households
immigrating into the village since 1967, we carry out the match for the initial year that the
household arrived in the village.
An additional diﬃculty arises with the individual exit dataset: no distinction was made in
the questionnaire between agricultural and non-agricultural land lost thereby (i.e., associated
with the exit). This complicated our calculation of agricultural landholdings. To deal with
this problem we considered three diﬀerent alternatives. The ﬁrst assumes that all land
reported in individual exits involved non-agricultural land, and therefore is not considered
in the analysis. The second assumes the opposite, i.e. that all land reported in individual
exits corresponds to (unirrigated) agricultural land. Finally, the third alternative assumes
that whenever there is “missing” agricultural land (by the iterative procedure described
above), it is accounted by land lost because of individual exits.
Table 2 presents the result of the iterative process for the three alternatives explained
above. When all land lost owing to individual exits is assumed to be non-agricultural
(alternative 1), around 88% of the households matched their reported landholdings in 1967,
upto a 0.2 acres margin of error. This ﬁgure increased to 91% when allowing for a 0.5
acre margin of error. The fact that we were able to reconstruct the land history for many
1For example, consider a household with 2 acres in 2004 that lost 1 acre due to household division in 1995
and bought 3 acres in 1970. Then, we would list the household as owning 2 acres each year from 1995-2004,
3 acres from 1970-1995, and 0 acres from 1967 until 1970.
6households implies that imperfect recall problems problems were not very important in
this context. The match rate fell to 82 and 86% respectively when we assume that land
lost from individual exits was entirely agricultural land (alternative 2). Therefore it seems
that land lost from individual exits correponds to other uses of land, such as homestead,
ponds or orchards. Finally we present the results for assuming that the gap between the
reconstructed agricultural land holdings and the self reported in 1967, if any, had to come
from agricultural land reported in the individual exit dataset (alternative 3). For this case
89% of the households matched their reported landholdings in 1967, upto a 0.2 acres margin
of error. This 1% improvement in comparison with the ﬁrst alternative corresponds to only
26 households. Hence we do not believe our lack of knowledge of type of land lost in exits is
of any signﬁcance. In the rest of the paper, we use the data implied by the third alternative
in order to construct the agricultural land time series for each household.
Finally, since there was no distinction between irrigated and unirrigated land in the
individual exit dataset, we assumed that all land coming from this dataset was unirrigated.
Whenever possible, we apportioned unirrigated to irrigated land to match initial and ﬁnal
holdings of irrigated and unirrigated land. There were a few household-year observeations
in which households still had negative land holdings, which were set equal to zero.
A similar check for household size and composition indicated consistent reports for 82%
of all households, shown in column 3 in Table 3. And when we seek consistent reports of
both demographics and land histories, we end up with 73% of the sample, shown in column
4 of Table 3.
We thereafter proceed on the basis of two samples. One is the restricted sample formed
by those households with consistent reports regarding both land and household size. The
other is the full sample. The diﬀerences between these two samples are presented in column
7 of Table 3. It shows the restricted sample contains a larger fraction of immigrants and
a smaller fraction of medium, large and big landowners. This is to be expected as recall
problems are less likely for immigrants or those owning less land. All subsequent results in
the paper are shown for both samples, to gauge the sensitivity of results to possible recall
problems.
3 Basic Facts
3.1 Trends in Land per Household
Figure 1 shows trend in agricultural land per household for the full and restricted sample,
averaged across all villages. In the full sample there is a sharp drop in the mean from nearly
3 acres per household to a little over 1 acre. The median drops by less, from 0.7 acre to
0. The third quartile drops from 3.6 acres to slightly above 1. The drop in mean, median
and third quartile is less dramatic in the restricted sample, but signiﬁcant nonetheless: both
the median and the third quartile are more than halved. By 2004 less than one quarter of
7households had more than 1 acre of land. Figure 2 shows similar but somewhat attenuated
patterns for the sample that excludes immigrant households.
Figure 3 shows corresponding trends for household size. The median falls from 6 to 5,
and the mean also falls by 1 unit, resulting in a reduction of the order of 16%. The steepest
fall is in the third quartile. The distribution of household size shrinks over time, with the
largest households shrinking by more. The inter-quartile range fell from 4–8 to 4–6.
The drop in household size was thus less dramatic than the drop in land per household.
Consequently land per capita fell by a factor of three, as shown in Figure 4. In the restricted
sample, the mean and third quartile dropped from 0.4 and 0.5 to near 0.2 acres per capita.
This conﬁrms the view commonly expressed in rural West Bengal that it is increasingly
diﬃcult for rural households to derive their livelihood from agriculture, creating an urgent
need to generate non-agricultural employment opportunities in the state. It is also evident
that the changes observed are gradual, with no noticeable ﬂuctuations across diﬀerent years.
Figure 5 shows similar patterns for native households.
To corroborate these ﬁndings, Table 4 shows changes in cultivable land and number of
households over two decades of the 1980s and 1990s, using the indirect household survey
used in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006, 2010). The number of households rose sharply,
while the amount of cultivable land remained approximately the same. This indicates that
conversion of agricultural land into forests or other non-agricultural purposes was not the
cause of the decline in land availability per household.
Returning to the direct household survey, immigration accounted for a 15% drop in
land per household for both the full and restricted samples, while for natives it dropped by
about 40%. Table 5 decomposes the latter change between diﬀerent channels. For the full
(restricted) sample, 81% (85%) of the decline in land for native households is accounted for
by land lost owing to household division, 6.6% (11%) to land market transactions, 6.3% (7%)
to gifts and transfers, 4.6% (-1.1%) for land reforms, and 3.6% (1.3%) for other miscellaneous
reasons. Hence land lost owing to household splits and migration of household members was
the dominant source, followed by immigration, land market transactions and transfers. The
direct eﬀect of land reforms was negligible. It is therefore necessary to evaluate possible
indirect ways in which land reforms aﬀected the land distribution, by aﬀecting processes of
household division, immigration and land transfers.
3.2 Trends in Inequality and Landlessness
Figure 6 shows that for the full sample within-village inequality (averaged across villages)
rose by 10% for the Gini and somewhat more (15–20%) for the coeﬃcient of variation. The
restricted sample shows a steeper increase for both the Gini and the coeﬃcient of variation
(17% increase). For this sample the Gini has a relatively lower level at the beginning of
the period, compared to the full sample (about 0.06 points). But this diﬀerence is almost
negligible at the end of the period. Figures 7 and 8 calculate the contribution of three
8principal channels by which household landholdings changed: household division, land mar-
ket transactions, and land reform respectively, using the following accounting exercise. For
each of these channels, we calculate the amount of land the household would have owned in
any given year had the landholding change associated with the corresponding channel not
occurred, and all other changes in landholding would have occurred as observed. We then
calculate the average within-village inequality that would have resulted, and subtract this
from the observed inequality to estimate the contribution of this channel.
These ﬁgures show clearly that the source of rising inequality was household division,
particularly after the mid-80s. Land market transactions contributed to a reduction in
inequality, by an extent depending on the precise inequality measure used and the sample
in question. In the case of the coeﬃcient of variation, the inequality reduction eﬀect of land
market transactions was more pronounced, mostly occurring by the mid-80s. However if we
use the Gini coeﬃcient instead, the land market had a more modest eﬀect on inequality,
and nearly zero in the case of the restricted sample. Finally, the role of the land reforms
was to reduce the coeﬃcient of variation by a magnitude comparable to the land market
for the period as a whole, though the eﬀect was weaker in the ﬁrst half of the period. For
the Gini coeﬃcient, by contrast, the direct eﬀect of the land reform was near zero for the
period as a whole, in both restricted and the full sample. Hence the land reforms exercised
a substantially weaker direct eﬀect on land inequality, compared to household division. The
signiﬁcance of the land reforms relative to land market transactions depends on the precise
inequality measure used.
Table 6 shows the distribution of land across diﬀerent size classes in 1967 and 2004.
Landlessness rose from 38% to 46% for natives, and 56% for the population including im-
migrants. The proportion of households that were either landless or marginal (owning less
than 1 acre) rose from 61% to 75% among natives, and 81% among the entire population.
This was accounted for by a drop mainly of small landowners (between 1 and 2.5 acres) and
large and big landowners (owning more than 5 acres).
In order to understand better the changes in the land distribution we examine the density
of the distribution of land for those households owning between 0 and 3 acres of land (i.e.
landless households were excluded). Figure 9 shows the results for both the full and restricted
sample, for three diﬀerent years (1970, 1985 and 2000). There are two striking results here.
First the density at each of these dates peaks at 0.5 acres, with a sharp drop below this level.
It suggests a minimum viable landholding size around half an acre. Second, changes in the
distribution involve a lowering of the density between one and three acres, and a rise in the
density at the half acre peak. Combined with the rising incidence of landlessness, it suggests
that there was an increasing tendency for the bottom tail of the land distribution to have
two peaks, one at the half acre mark, and the other at zero. It suggests a process whereby
land owned by most landed households tended to drift downwards (following division of the
household over time), until it hit the half acre threshold, whereupon the household would
either struggle to preserve its landholding or rapidly progress to landlessness.
9In order to gauge the eﬀect of rising landlessness on land inequality, we also examined the
distribution of land among households owning land in 2004. These are not shown here, in
order to conserve space. Brieﬂy, land inequality among landowning households as measured
by the coeﬃcient of variation declined in the ﬁrst half of the period, and rose thereafter
to neutralize the earlier decline. In the case of the Gini coeﬃcient there was a signiﬁcant
decline. Hence the rise in inequality observed for either inequality measure was primarily
accounted for by rising landlessness.
3.3 Immigration
Figure 10 focuses on the role of immigration, deﬁned by arrival of the household in question in
the village after 1967. This includes both domestic and foreign immigrants. The proportion
of immigrants rose smoothly to approximately 28% (33% in the restricted sample). Clearly
the demographic share of immigrants amongst the landless is much larger than in the village
population as a whole, so the arrival of immigrants tended to swell the ranks of landless
households. Less than a third of this was accounted for by immigrants from Bangladesh,
which tended to level oﬀ after 1995.
We have discussed above how immigration explains about one-third of the observed
reduction in land per household. The role of immigration in contributing to inequality is
illustrated by comparing the rise in inequality within native households (shown in Figure
11) with the rise in inequality in the village as a whole (Figure 6). The Gini rose by
about 4% instead of 10%, and the rise in coeﬃcient of variation is also halved. Hence the
two main factors accounting for the observed rise in inequality were household division and
immigration, whose combined eﬀect outweighed the inequality reducing eﬀects of land reform
and market transactions. During the ﬁrst half of the period (until 1985) inequality among
natives actually fell (for CV) and remained stationary (for the Gini), owing to the greater
eﬀect of the market and land reform. Subsequently household divisions accelerated to cause
inequality to increase overall, both among the native population as well as for the village as
a whole.
3.4 Land Market Transactions
Figure 12 shows the size and frequency of land market transactions. These are not necessarily
balanced because we are working with a sample of households rather than the entire village
population. Besides we exclude non-residents who may own some land, as well as those
who may have left the village between 1967 and 2004. Nevertheless it is apparent that the
sales and purchases approximately balance each other in the data, except the last 5 years
or so when the sales outstrip the purchases (which may reﬂect an increasing tendency for
non-residents to purchase land). However the extent of excess sales towards the end is of
the order of 0.2–0.25 acres, not large enough to explain the mean reduction in land per
10resident household in excess of 1 acre for the period as a whole shown in Figure 1. It is
within the margin of variation observed from year to year during the period in queston, thus
unlikely to be statistically signiﬁcant. Note also that the land transactions are considerable
in frequency, and occur throughout the period. Hence the land market has been quite active.
In the full sample there is a tendency for rising extent of transactions in the ﬁrst half, with
some noticeable spikes between 1980–85, the period of heightened land reform activity. In
the restricted sample these spikes are muted, with no evident tendency to be bunched in
the earlier period. The earlier decompositions indicated that the land market transactions
tended to reduce the coeﬃcient of variation, and did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
Gini. We shall investigate the inequality eﬀects in more detail below.
3.5 Land Reform
Figure 13 shows lands lost and gained by households owing to land reform. In both sample
the lands appropriated exceed those distributed, conﬁrming the observation in Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2010) that much land that is appropriated by land reform authorities is not
distributed as titles, reﬂecting either legal roadblocks or corruption. As in the case of land
market transactions, the spikes in lands appropriated are muted in the case of the restricted
sample. This indicates that the restricted sample tends to miss households that lost a lot of
land owing to the reforms that happened till the mid-80s. But there are still spikes in the
restricted sample between 1970 and 1985, and only one later year (around the mid-90s). The
spikes indicate an excess of land appropriated over distributed which in three years happens
to exceed 0.1 acre, and is nearly 0.4 acres in one year. This accounts for the slight negative
contribution of the land reforms to land per household noted above.
Figure 14 uses data from the local land records oﬃces for both tenancy registration
(barga) and land title distribution (patta) for the village as a whole, until the year 1998 (the
year when the oﬃcial village level data on land reform was collected). The ﬁgure on the left
expresses the extent of land reform as percent of cultivable land, while the latter as a percent
of households. These data series are taken from Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006, 2010), with
the land area and household numbers calculated on the basis of interpolation of estimates
from the indirect household survey for years 1978 and 1998. Both sets of land reforms were
pronounced between the late 1970s and mid-80s, with the tenancy reform more signiﬁcant
in terms of cultivable land area and the land titling program more signiﬁcant in terms of
the number of households directly beneﬁtting. This reﬂects the phenomenon described in
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) for tenants involved in the reform to be cultivating fertile
plots in excess of an acre, while land titles were typically low quality land well under an
acre.
113.6 Household Division
Figure 15 breaks down changes in household size into diﬀerent sources: births, in-marriages
(i.e., those who join the household via marriage), household division and other exits (includ-
ing deaths, out-migration and out-marriages). Births rose over the period, while in-marriages
had a steady eﬀect on household size. These were outweighed by household division and
other exits, generating a negative overall impact. Other exits were more pronounced in the
ﬁrst half of the period, while household division tended to arise especially in the second
half. Exits owing to out-migration, out-marriages and household splits typically reduce land
owned by the household, as departing members tend to leave with a certain share of the
land. To the extent that big landowning households are more prone to such divisions than
the rest of the village, land inequality tends to decline. However if small and marginal
landowning households divide, it reduces their landholdings to below minimum viable sizes
of cultivation, raising landlessness and inequality. Hence the eﬀects of household division on
the land distribution depend on the size classes in which they are particularly pronounced.
To examine this, Tables 7, 8 and 9 show division rates and land lost for households
dividing, for diﬀerent size classes. Over the entire period, the former table shows that the
division rates for landless, marginal and small households were higher than for medium,
large and big households. There is a peak in the division rate in the 1977-1986 decade, after
which the rates go down again to the pre-70 levels. Table 9 shows the net rate at which
land was lost for diﬀerent size classes. For the period as a whole, small households lost land
at a higher rate (around 1.45% per year) than big households, who lost land at 1.20% per
year. This reinforces our claim that division of small households led to rising inequality and
landlessness.
4 Indirect Eﬀects of Land Reform: Regression Results
In this section we explore the possible indirect role of land reforms in changing land distribu-
tion by aﬀecting land market transactions, household division and immigration. We predict
market transactions and division of households, utilizing the household panel, controlling
for household demographics, land owned and status vis-a-vis land ceilings deﬁned by the
land reform regulations. Land reforms implemented in the village are measured by the pro-
portion of land or households aﬀected directly by the tenancy registration and land titling
program in the village in question. These may have signaled the seriousness with which
the land reforms were being implemented in the local area, thus aﬀecting the inclination of
large landowning households with land in excess of the ceiling to sub-divide or sell land in
order to avoid having their lands appropriated by land reform authorities. Large landown-
ing households below the ceiling may also have been aﬀected by either kind of land reform.
Operation Barga is likely to have reduced the proﬁtability of leasing out land to tenants,
while the land titling program may have raised wage rates for agricultural workers, reducing
12the proﬁtability of cultivating land using hired workers.2 The land titling program may also
have increased the inclination of small and medium landowning households to divide into
landless or marginal fragments in order to become eligible to receive the land titles.
Many other factors would be expected to aﬀect incentives to divide or sell land. Demo-
graphic events (such as births, deaths, marriages, out-migration) that alter household size
could trigger divisions or sales, as these change the ratio of land owned to family labor.
Large households with multiple adult siblings may have a greater tendency to sub-divide
owing to greater free-riding in household collective activities, lower value placed on house-
hold colective goods and increasing desire for privacy and independence in lifestyle as living
standards increase (see e.g., models of Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) and Guirkinger and
Platteau (2011)). We do not model the process of division or market transactions in this
paper. Instead our intention is to examine the patterns in the data, as a prelude to any such
modeling exercise.
We present reduced form regressions which predict land market transactions or household
division for a household in any given year, based on lagged household size which incorporate
the eﬀect of recent demographic events, lagged landholdings, and recent incidence of land
reforms implemented in the village, besides household and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In all of the
following regressions, we use the average of land reforms implemented in the village in the
past three years.3 We calculate the land ceiling applicable to the household in question in any
given year, using information concerning the number of household members and amounts
of irrigated and unirrigated land owned in that year. This is used to create a dummy for
whether the household is subject to the ceiling in any given year. The controls for land
size include quadratic and cubic terms, so by including a ceiling dummy and interactions
of this dummy with various measures of land reform activity in the village we examine how
households above the ceiling behave diﬀerently from those below.
4.1 Household Division
Table 10 presents a logit regression predicting the event that a household experienced a
division in any given year. The likelihood rises signiﬁcantly with lagged household size, con-
trolling for landholdings. It also rises in landholdings, though the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant
across all speciﬁcations. Columns 2 and 6 show that recent implementation of Operation
Barga (measured by proportion of cultivable land aﬀected) decelerated division rates sig-
niﬁcantly more for small landowning households, while it accelerated division for the large
2Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) found using a farm panel for these villages between 1982-95 that
Operation Barga induced substitution of family labor for hired labor and a corresponding reduction in
the wage rate. The land titling program also induced a similar substitution pattern, with a positive but
statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on wages of hired workers.
3We also examine a variant where this is replaced by the average of the reforms implemented for the
subsequent three years, in case households were able to anticipate the reforms. The results were less sharp
in that formulation, though qualitatively similar. Hence we do not show them here.
13ones (above around 4 acres). This result is robust across diﬀerent speciﬁcations and sam-
ples (columns 3,4,7,8) . Hence the tenancy registration program tended to lower inequality.
In contrast the land titling program raised division rates of households, irrespective of the
amount of land owned, implying an ambiguous indirect eﬀect on inequality.
Households with land above the ceiling subdivided at a discontinuously higher rate,
compared to those just below the ceiling. This is indicated by column 3, which show that the
ceiling eﬀect does not disappear upon inclusion of quadratic and cubic terms in landholding.
Column 6 however shows that the ceiling eﬀect is smaller and imprecisely measured. Most
likely this is because the restricted sample does not contain the large landowning households
that broke up in the ﬁrst half of the period. The land reform legislation thus tended to
accelerate the break up of large landowning households, reducing inequality.
We turn now to the amount of land lost, conditional on dividing, shown in Table 11.
In the ﬁrst column we see that household size, landholding and the above-ceiling dummy
positively aﬀected the amount of land lost by dividing households, while land reform im-
plementation did not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. When the interactions of ceiling
with landholding and barga are included (column 2), the eﬀect of the ceiling dummy be-
comes negative but insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, the interaction of ceiling with barga
has a very large coﬃcient, though imprecisely estimated. This coeﬃcient is even larger and
statistically signiﬁcant in the restricted sample (column 4). Therefore households above the
ceiling were losing (or giving away) more land in those villages where Operation Barga was
implemented more vigorously.
In summary we see evidence that implementation of the tenancy registration program
indirectly reduced inequality via their eﬀect on household division patterns, i.e. inducing
large households to divide at a larger rate and to give away larger amounts of cultivable
land conditional on division.
4.2 Land Market Transactions and Gifts
Table 12 present regressions for net sales (sales minus purchases) as explained by the same
set of explanatory variables. As expected, lagged household size has a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect, while lagged landownership has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. This conﬁrms that land
market transactions tended to equalize the land distribution.
Regarding the indirect eﬀect of land reforms, the full sample (columns 1 and 2) shows
no evidence that above-ceiling households behaved diﬀerently with respect to net sales. Nor
is there any evidence of a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of land reform implementation rates. In
the restricted sample (columns 3 and 4) ceiling has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on net
sales, though it is not signiﬁcant when the interactions are included.
Table 13 presents analogous regressions for net gifts (gifts given, minus received) of land.
Again we see no signiﬁcant eﬀect of land reform implementation rates.
144.3 Immigration
Table 14 considers the determinants of demographic share of post-1967 immigrants, at the
village level. Columns 1 and 3 regresses this on contemporaneous land per household, and
measures of land reform, besides village and year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 present
corresponding Arellano-Bond regressions with a lagged dependent variable. There is a sig-
niﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on land availability, possibly reﬂecting the greater tendency for
immigrants to settle in areas of high population density (owing to their concern for ﬁnding
employment as workers). But we see no robust signiﬁcant eﬀects of the land reform on
immigrant inﬂows.
4.4 Reduced Form Impact of Land Reforms on Land Inequality
Above we have found that the tenancy reforms had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on inequality
via their eﬀect on divisions of small and large landowning households in opposite directions,
with no corresponding eﬀect on land market transactions or immigration. The land title
reforms did not seem to aﬀect any of these processes.
Tables 15 and 16 examine the total impact of the land reform measures implemented
on changes in land inequality. Table 15 presents a cross-village regression predicting 1998
inequality (either Gini coeﬃcient or coeﬃcient of variation) by the cumulative land reforms
implemented since 1968 and the level of inequality in 1968. Here the land title program
(measured by the proportion of land area distributed, or households receiving titles) registers
a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient in three out of the four regressions (the only exception
being the Gini regression in the restricted sample). With approximately one-third of all
1967 households receiving titles, the estimates for the full sample imply a 0.18 drop in the
coeﬃcient of variation, and a 0.03 drop in the Gini. We interpret this as resulting from the
direct eﬀect of the distribution of land titles in limiting the incidence of landlessness, which
overcame any opposite eﬀect operating through higher rates of division of small households.
This is conﬁrmed by Table 16 which presents the corresponding cross-village regression
for the proportion of households that are landless, which shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
proportion of households receiving land titles in reducing landlessness. The magnitude of
this coeﬃcient is large, implying a reduction of landlessness by about 6%.
Table 15 shows a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of Operation Barga in reducing inequality
in the restricted sample. The eﬀect is much smaller and not signiﬁcant in the full sample.
Given the regression results above, we interpret this as resulting partly from the indirect
inﬂuence on household division rates. The quantitative impact is not large, even if we use
the estimates from the restricted sample, since only about 8% of all 1967 households were
registered in the program. The coeﬃcients in the restricted sample regression predicts an
impact of .03 for the CV and .02 for the Gini.
155 Summary and Concluding Observations
We summarize our main conclusions.
1. There was a signiﬁcant reduction in land owned per capita and land per household.
The most important factor causing land per household to fall was household division,
followed by immigration. There was no evidence of signiﬁcant conversion of land from
agricultural to non-agricultural purposes. Sales to non-residents is also unlikely to
have been a signiﬁcant factor, as net sales of land by residents accounted for a small
fraction of land loss.
2. Within-village inequality also rose, by between 10 to 20%, depending on the inequal-
ity measure used. The most important contributing factor was household division,
particularly of small landowning households that became ultimately landless. Rising
immigration also contributed to rising inequality, since immigrant households typically
arrive in a landless status. Hence a combination of demographic factors and techno-
logical conditions (viz, scale economies wherein farms below a certain size become
uneconomical) were the principal drivers of rising inequality.
3. Land market transactions eﬀects on the Gini were negligible, but signiﬁcantly negative
for the coeﬃcient of variation. Households owning more land tended to sell more,
controlling for household size. Even for the CV measure of inequality, this eﬀect
was not signiﬁcant enough to overcome the inequality-enhancing eﬀects of household
division and immigration.
4. The direct eﬀects of the land reform on inequality were negative for the coeﬃcient
of variation, and negligible for the Gini coeﬃcient. In the case of the former, it
was roughly equal in magnitude to the inequality-reducing impact of land market
transactions. In the case of both measures, it was dominated by the eﬀect of household
division and immigration.
5. Household division among small and marginal landowning households tended to raise
inequality, while among large landowning households lowered inequality. Since the
late-80s, the former eﬀect dominated, resulting in rising landlessness and inequality
overall.
6. There is some evidence that the tenancy reform tended to reduce inequality indirectly,
mainly via induced impacts on household division. Households with more landholdings
were more likely to divide, and more likely to give away more land, especially in those
villages where Operation Barga was more intense.
7. There is no evidence of an indirect eﬀect of the land reforms on market transactions,
gifts or immigration.
168. Consistent with these results, the overall reduced form impact of the land reform on
inequality and landlessness was negative – the land title program reduced landlessness
directly, while the tenancy program reduced inequality indirectly through its eﬀects on
household divisions. The former eﬀect was quantitatively more signiﬁcant in lowering
inequality. However, all of these were dwarfed by the inequality enhancing eﬀects of
division of small landowning households and immigration.
The main focus of this paper has been to understand the main facts, rather than modeling
the complex behavior of households with respect to division, immigration and land market
transactions. Future attempts to understand changes in land distribution in West Bengal
will have to pay more attention to these. In particular, the factors determining household
division need to be investigated more thoroughly.
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26Table 1: Individual exits / household division dataset: Summary statistics
# Total Mean 50th p. 75th p. 95th p.
(1) Death of member of the household 250 106.71 0.43 0.00 0.14 3.00
(2) Exit of spouse of head 18 15.88 0.88 0.03 2.00 2.82
(3) Out-marriage 365 203.96 0.56 0.01 0.66 2.00
(4) Exit/division due to other reasons 3,940 3,648.24 0.67 0.06 0.70 3.16
Notes: All ﬁgures are in acres, except for #, the total number of events. (4) includes change in household
size, change in income/expenditure, disputes, registration of tenants and threat of land reforms.
Table 2: Constructing Agricultural Land Time Series
Alternative: (1) (2) (3)
% of households matching self-reported and reconstructed
landholdings in 1967
Margin of 0.2 acres 87.84 82.43 88.93
Margin of 0.5 acres 90.76 86.01 91.72
Abs. diﬀerence between self-reported and reconstructed
landholdings in 1967 (acres)
Mean 0.35 0.53 0.32
75th percentile 0.00 0.00 0.00
90th percentile 0.40 1.02 0.33
95th percentile 1.67 3.33 1.34
Notes: In alternative 1 all land reported in exits of individual members is not agricultural. In alternative 2
all land reported in exits of individual members is agricultural. In alternative 3 we ﬁll the gap between















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 4: Changes in cultivable land and number of households, indirect survey
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Initial report prior to 1980
Cultivable land in initial year 63 358.5 303.6 18.0 1265.5
Cultivable land in 1998 63 360.2 283.3 26.2 1304.0
Change in cultivable land 63 1.7 148.2 -843.8 244.4
No. households in initial year 63 231.0 219.5 24.0 1083.0
No. households in 1998 63 419.5 380.3 47.0 1692.0
Change in No. households 63 188.5 192.6 -6.0 841.0
Initial report after 1980
Cultivable land in initial year 26 230.6 170.1 4.6 642.7
Cultivable land in 1998 26 217.6 149.2 9.6 495.3
Change in cultivable land 26 -13.0 66.5 -225.3 109.9
No. households in initial year 26 236.7 156.0 18.0 759.0
No. households in 1998 26 346.7 186.9 60.0 770.0
Change in No. households 26 110.0 83.0 10.0 332.0
Notes: Cultivable land is measured in acres. 46 villages report cultivable land in 1977, 14 in 1978, 3 in
1979, 1 in 1980, 1 in 1981, 23 in 1983, and 1 in 1984.
Table 5: Determinants of decrease in land holdings: cumulative changes at the household
level, only natives (1967-2004)
Sample: full restricted
Land change -1.370 -0.926
Lost due to land division -1.108 -0.785
Lost through sales -0.557 -0.475
Gained through purchases 0.467 0.373
Lost due to reform -0.097 -0.018
Gained due to reform 0.034 0.028
Lost as a gift -0.116 -0.097
Gained as a gift 0.030 0.032
Lost for other reasons -0.060 -0.024
Gained for other reasons 0.011 0.012
Notes: All numbers indicate average acres gained or lost per household. The category Lost for other
reasons includes forced transfer, mortgaged, and lost due to natural disasters.
29Table 6: Proportion of households in each land category (restricted sample)
Initial Final (2002-2004)
Land Class (1967-1971) natives and immigrants only natives
Landless 38.47 56.23 46.05
Marginal 22.36 24.45 29.34
Small 11.76 4.96 6.16
Medium 13.56 8.38 10.63
Large 9.91 4.96 6.55
Big 3.94 1.02 1.27
Notes: Numbers indicate the proportion of households in each category. Numbers are percentages.
Table 7: Proportion of households dividing (restricted sample)
Land Class 1967 - 2004 1967 - 1971 1972 - 1976 1977 - 1981 1982 - 1986
Landless 2.43 1.23 2.32 2.56 3.51
Marginal 2.39 1.23 2.05 2.44 3.22
Small 2.68 1.34 1.30 3.19 4.39
Medium 1.80 1.43 1.47 2.10 2.55
Large 1.92 1.10 1.13 3.96 2.56
Big 0.79 0.50 1.09 0.00 1.81
Land Class 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997 - 2001 2002 - 2004
Landless 2.25 2.70 2.53 1.79
Marginal 2.56 2.04 2.87 2.08
Small 2.96 4.47 2.55 1.15
Medium 1.33 1.47 2.21 1.64
Large 1.71 1.89 2.29 1.97
Big 0.00 1.83 0.49 0.00
Notes: All numbers indicate the proportion of households that divided in a given period of time. Division
means one or more members left the household. Numbers are percentages.
30Table 8: Proportion of land lost due to division, conditional on dividing (restricted sample)
Land Class 1967 - 2004 1967 - 1971 1972 - 1976 1977 - 1981 1982 - 1986
Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal 14.88 6.67 2.39 7.69 10.95
Small 19.10 5.56 8.90 0.00 12.64
Medium 11.87 4.55 11.11 12.18 10.14
Large 12.68 1.67 3.17 4.59 17.11
Big 7.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.04
Land Class 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997 - 2001 2002 - 2004
Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal 20.56 19.06 19.66 11.54
Small 31.53 33.02 17.91 33.33
Medium 9.04 24.17 12.06 13.55
Large 6.07 15.31 17.10 30.47
Big 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Numbers indicate the proportion of land that households lost due to division (one or more members
left the household). Numbers are percentages. Landless households have some land gave away because at
the same time they gained land through purchase or other source.
Table 9: Proportion of land lost due to division, unconditional (restricted sample)
Land Class 1967 - 2004 1967 - 1971 1972 - 1976 1977 - 1981 1982 - 1986
Landless 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marginal 0.98 0.33 0.20 0.64 0.78
Small 1.45 0.07 0.66 0.41 1.31
Medium 1.14 0.32 0.87 1.26 1.79
Large 1.08 0.37 0.87 0.58 0.99
Big 1.20 1.68 0.35 0.64 2.29
Land Class 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997 - 2001 2002 - 2004
Landless 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00
Marginal 1.33 1.60 1.26 0.72
Small 2.23 3.46 1.72 1.80
Medium 1.26 1.98 0.85 0.95
Large 0.81 2.10 1.33 1.43
Big 0.36 2.25 0.91 1.04
Notes: Numbers indicate the proportion of land that households lost due to division (one or more members
left the household). Numbers are percentages. Landless households have some land gave away because at
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 11: Determinants of land lost by households when dividing (using lagged reform)
Dep. Variable: Land given away (acres)
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged HH Size 0.09800** 0.10343** 0.05602 0.06857
(0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.043)
pattaland 0.43236 0.39263 0.23658 0.15519
(0.774) (0.750) (0.232) (0.215)
bargaland -0.04736 -0.02489 -0.28258 -0.07794
(0.113) (0.094) (0.266) (0.228)
Ceiling dummy 1.84560** -0.28339 3.13873** -2.02747
(0.890) (2.826) (1.449) (7.760)
Lagged land 0.66015*** 0.65727*** 0.70973*** 0.77254***
(0.230) (0.198) (0.236) (0.216)
Lagged land2 -0.01488 -0.01488 -0.01170 -0.02482
(0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025)
Lagged land3 -0.00018 -0.00023 -0.00137** -0.00124***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)




Lagged land*bargaland -0.04032 -0.05031** 0.00912 -0.03888
(0.031) (0.022) (0.059) (0.048)
Constant -1.71003*** -1.33874*** -0.47460 -0.53505
(0.375) (0.414) (0.298) (0.323)
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.191 0.426 0.442
Observations 2,640 2,640 1,808 1,808
No. households 1,395 1,395 968 968
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. Regressions include
household ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. pattaland and bargaland are computed as the sum over the
previous three years of the share of land aﬀected by each program over the total cultivable land in each
village. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
33Table 12: Determinants of net sales (sales – purchases), using lagged land reform (average
for past 3 years)
Dep. Variable: Net agricultural land sold (acres)
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged HH Size -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0034*** -0.0033***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011)
pattaland -0.0242 -0.0240 -0.0329 -0.0331
(0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0305) (0.0307)
bargaland -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0054 -0.0052
(0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054)
ceiling -0.0325 0.0104 0.0890* 0.1651
(0.0531) (0.0988) (0.0466) (0.1888)
Lagged Land 0.0432*** 0.0422*** 0.0524*** 0.0515***
(0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0110)
Lagged land2 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0017*
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Lagged land3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lagged land*bargaland -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)




Constant -0.0712*** -0.0714*** -0.0584*** -0.0586***
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0108)
Adjusted R2 0.0143 0.0143 0.0241 0.0241
Observations 54,175 54,175 38,190 38,190
No. househods 2,268 2,268 1,649 1,649
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. Regressions include
household ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. pattaland and bargaland are computed as the sum over the
previous three years of the share of land aﬀected by each program over the total cultivable land in each
village. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
34Table 13: Determinants of net land gifts, using lagged land reform (average for past 3 years)
Dep. Variable: Net agricultural land lost as gift (acres)
Sample: full restricted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged HH Size -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0007* -0.0008**
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0004)
pattaland 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0011
(0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0116) (0.0111)
bargaland 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
ceiling 0.0127 -0.1500 0.0050 -0.1926
(0.0194) (0.1444) (0.0262) (0.3053)
Lagged land 0.0085 0.0123 -0.0021 0.0002
(0.0063) (0.0093) (0.0080) (0.0051)
Lagged land2 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0012 0.0010
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Lagged land3 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Lagged land*bargaland -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)




Constant -0.0128** -0.0119** -0.0046** -0.0042*
(0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Adjusted R2 0.0075 0.0082 0.0048 0.0056
Observations 54,175 54,175 38,190 38,190
No. households 2,268 2,268 1,649 1,649
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. Regressions include
household ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. pattaland and bargaland are computed as the sum over the
previous three years of the share of land aﬀected by each program over the total cultivable land in each
village. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
35Table 14: Determinants of immigration, village panel (restricted sample)
Dependent variable: Share of immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Arellano Fixed Arellano
Eﬀects Bond Eﬀects Bond
Lagged share of immigrants 0.4277*** 0.4277***
(0.1196) (0.1196)
Lagged land per capita -0.0980* 0.0162 -0.0981* 0.0162
(0.0528) (0.0269) (0.0528) (0.0269)
Lagged bargaland -0.0024* -0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0006)
Lagged pattaland 0.0297* 0.0063
(0.0152) (0.0103)
Lagged bargahh -0.0096 0.0015
(0.0268) (0.0052)
Lagged pattahh 0.0111 0.0009
(0.0150) (0.0087)
Constant 0.0822*** 0.1358*** 0.0936*** 0.1358***
(0.0273) (0.0325) (0.0263) (0.0325)
Adjusted R2 0.4499 0.4497
p-value from test for f.o. autocorr. 0.0000 0.0000
p-value from test for s.o. autocorr. 0.5990 0.6016
Observations 2,666 2,577 2,666 2,577
No. villages 89 89 89 89
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering on villages. Regressions include
village and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In (1) and (2), pattaland and bargaland are computed as the share of land
aﬀected by each program over the total cultivable land in each village. In (3) and (4), pattahh and
bargahh are computed as the share of households aﬀected by each program over the total number of















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 16: The eﬀect of land reform on the proportion of landless households: cross section
village regressions
Dependent variable: Share of landless in 1998
(1) (2)












Adjusted R2 0.533 0.628
Observations 89 89
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. In (1) cumulative pattaland and bargaland are computed as
the share of total land aﬀected by each program over the total cultivable land in each village. In (2)
cumulative pattahh and bargahh are computed as the share of total households aﬀected by each program
over the total number of households per village. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
38